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Summary
Dividend payout ratio, dividend yield for non-life insurance industry
are studied in detail. A dividend behavior model is developed for the
non-life insurance industry. It is found that income measures, ownership
and capacity ratio are important factors to be considered in doing the
above-mentioned empirical studies.
Acknowledgment
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the S.S.
Heubner Foundation for Insurance Education of the University of Pennsylvania.
We also acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Dongsae Cho, and the editorial
comments of J. David Cummins.

The dividend policy of the firm is important for several reasons. An
understanding of the factors influencing dividend payments contributes to
the theory of corporate savings. Dividends may also influence the price
per share of common stock, thus dividend behavior is of interest because
it affects the maximization of shareholder wealth. In addition, dividend
policy also plays a direct role in the firm's financing and investment
decision.
While the factors influencing the dividend policies of industrial
firms have been studied in some detail by Lintner [12], Brittain [2],
Fama and Babiak [5], Dhrymes and Kurz [4], and others, theories of divi-
dend behavior have not been as extensively developed and explored for
financial firms. The purpose of this research is to study the dividend
behavior of one type of financial intermediary, the non-life insurance
company, to test whether existing dividend behavioral theories are ap-
plicable to the non-life insurance firms.
The argument is based upon the fact that the financial management
principles of financial institutions are not necessarily identical to
those of industrial firms. Specifically, the non-life insurance company
deals with (1) different income measures which affect reported earnings
and retained earnings, (2) is subject to a unique borrowing-lending rate
relationship, and (3) has an asset portfolio comprised primarily of se-
curities of industrial firms. In addition, most insurance stocks are
traded over the counter instead of NYSE. If the dividend practices of
these firms depart from those anticipated by the theories used to explain
the dividend behavior of industrial firms, this is of interest to the
understanding of the financial behavior of such firms. On the other hand,
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dividend payment patterns which follow the theoretical anticipations will
tend to strengthen them.
Brittain said that econometric modeling is an exercise in persuasion
[3], The purpose of this study is not to persuade the reader as to the
validity of a particular financial theory involving dividend behavior.
Rather, it has the less ambitious but useful objective of ascertaining
whether non-life insurance companies follow widely accepted financial
models found to be successful in describing dividend behavior.
Certain problems are somewhat unique to the non-life insurance in-
dustry. They include the following: (1) There are several income mea-
sures that may be used as the basis for the dividend decision; statutory
or generally accepted accounting principle earnings; including unrealized
capital gains and losses or excluding them, and (2) the capital and sur-
plus position of the non-life insurer, as a measure of financial capacity,
may influence the dividend decision; there are also other matters par-
ticular to the study of insurance companies which include: (1) some
non-life insurers pay dividends to policyholders as well as shareholders,
(2) a widespread parent-subsidiary relationship found in the non-life
insurance industry, and (3) the total dividend freeze of 1971 and partial
freeze of 1972 in the United States. These factors may complicate any
study of non-life insurance company dividend behavior.
Two econometric models will be used in this study. First, the model
developed by Lintner [12] and Fama and Babiak [5] which defines current
dividends as a function of current after-tax profits and the preceding
year's dividends will be used to do the empirical study. The rationale
underlying this model is that the ability to pay, as measured by corporate
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earnings, should have a great influence on dividend payments, and the
prior dividend should influence the current dividend to the extent that
dividend stability is viewed as desirable. Secondly, the seemingly un-
related regression technique [SUR] developed by Zellner [15] will be
used in order to take care of the possible simultaneous relationship
over time.
The next section of this paper presents the earnings payout ratios
and dividend yields for 61 non-life insurers during 1955-1975; the divi-
dend decision behavior for non-life insurers is also explored. In the
second section, the dividend behavior models used in research involving
industrial firms are specified and modified in order to describe the
dividend behavior of non-life insurance companies. The possible impli-
cations arising from the empirical results are justified in accordance
with the nature of insurance accounting procedures and financial opera-
tions. In the third section, the SUR technique is used in order to in-
vestigate the possible simultaneous relationship among the factors pre-
sented in the model described in the second section. Aggregate dividend
behavior is also examined in this section. The final section of the paper
summarizes the implications of the empirical results for financial theory
as it relates to the non-life insurance industry.
I. THE DIVIDEND YIELD AND EARNINGS PAYOUT
RATIO AND DIVIDEND DECISION BEHAVIOR
Information regarding the dividend yields and the earnings payout
ratios for non-life insurers is of interest to both investors and finan-
cial managers. Theoretically, the magnitude of the earnings payout ratio
for a firm is jointly determined by its investment opportunities and its
shareholders' preferences. This decision is complicated in the situation
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of a non-life insurer by the payment of policyholder dividends. The
nature of policyholder dividends are not necessarily identical to those
of equity holder dividends. This is due to the fact policyholders are
not necessarily owners of non-life insurance companies.
If a firm has an investment opportunity with a return exceeding its
cost of capital, and the internal sources of funds are cheaper than the
external sources, then a financial manager will generally reduce his firm's
earnings payout ratio.
In relation to external financing, stock non-life insurers are limited
to the following alternatives: (1) mergers and acquisitions involving
other insurance companies, (2) new stock issues, (3) contributions from
a parent insurer or holding company, and/or (4) borrowing of funds for gen-
eral business purposes (the latter by Section 76, New York Insurance Code,
amendment effective September 1, 1969).
In the situation of a merger, one of the insurers loses its identity
and the surviving company absorbs all of its assets, liabilities, and
legal rights. The shareholders of the merged insurer usually retain a
financial interest in the new firm consistent with their interest in the
acquired firm. The acquisition may involve either the use of cash or a
tax-free exchange of shares.
A stock non-life insurer can also acquire a subsidiary insurer by
gaining ownership of more than 50 percent of its voting stock using either
cash or an exchange of securities. As a practical matter, Forbes [7]
found that non-life insurers usually use exchanges of stock in acquiring
subsidiaries because of the attractiveness of this approach from tax and
liquidity standpoints. Forbes also found that new stock issues are a
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relatively unimportant form of non-life insurance external financing,
comprising slightly more than 5 percent of the total financing volume
during the 1955-66 period studied [7].
The advantages of external financing involving contributions from
a parent insurer or holding company are its simplicity and the lack of
substantial transactions costs. The borrowing of funds for general
business purposes is a relatively new external financing option in the
non-life insurance industry which has not been explored at length in
the financial literature except for Nye [13].
Forbes found in another study [8] that new money flowing into the
non-life insurance industry played a minor role in the industry's capital
and surplus growth during 1956-70. Given this behavior, the conservation
of capital and surplus would appear to be a primary non-life insurance
company objective in the typical situation. Inasmuch as dividend policy
provides one of the important mechanisms for controlling the level of
retained earnings, one would expect dividend policies of non-life insur-
ance companies to be geared to the insurer's capital and surplus require-
ments. Empirical results reported later in this study suggest a direct
relationship between dividend policies and capital and surplus adjust-
ments in this industry.
Haugen and Kroncke [10] have argued that policyholder funds also
represent a source of external financing to the non-life insurance in-
dustry. Other things remaining equal, an increase in the ratio of an
insurer's unearned premium and loss ar.d loss adjustment expense reserves
to its capital and surplus will affect the risk/return relationships in-
volving its shareholders. However, this interesting problem is not
studied in this paper.
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Data associated with four different income measures and the divi-
dends for 61 firms (see Appendix A) during 1955-75 are used in order to
analyze the earnings payout behavior for the non-life insurance industry.
The stratified random sampling technique is used to select the sample
insurers. Three strata represent three alternative ownerships (see the
discussion in this section and Appendix A). The insurers were selected
at random from the population of firms in Best's Property Liability (for-
merly Best's Fire and Casualty ) Insurance Reports having complete series
of 1955-1975 financial data. The stock price data were taken from the
Bank Quotation Record . The four different methods of calculating the net
2
income of a non-life insurer involve the following:
(A) earnings without the amortization of underwriting expenses
and without unrealized capital gains and losses
(B) earnings without the amortization of underwriting expenses
and with unrealized capital gains and losses
(C) earnings involving the amortization of underwriting ex-
penses without unrealized capital gains and losses
(D) earnings involving the amortization of underwriting ex-
penses with unrealized capital gains and losses
Under the accounting procedures used to measure (A) and (B), the
first year acquisition costs for insurance policies are written off imme-
diately against earnings without proper allocation to the periods in
which the associated premiums are earned. This method is required under
statutory accounting. It is also the method of accounting used in fed-
eral income tax calculations.
In the situation of an insurer with an expanding premium volume,
this accounting technique usually understates profits (overstates losses)
and understates capital and surplus. This is viewed by regulators as
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desirable because the resulting excess valuation in the unearned premium
reserve (UPR) may provide additional surplus if the insurer encounters
financial difficulty (there will be no excess valuation of course if
all of the UPR is required for the payment of losses and loss adjustment
expenses). The lack of underwriting expense amortization under statutory
accounting also tends to make insurers more cautious in obtaining new
business since there are large surplus reductions if premium expansion
is too rapid.
Income measures (C) and (D) involve the proper amortization of
underwriting expenses. This is accomplished by adding to earnings the
after-tax prepaid expense involving the increase in the unearned premium
for the period. The increase in the UPR is multiplied by (l-x)E , where
t is the marginal federal income tax rate for the year and E equals the
ratio of underwriting expenses to net written premiums.
The other adjustment in the paper involves the inclusion of un-
realized capital gains and losses in income measures (B) and (D). This
"flow-through" approach to measuring earnings eliminates the potential
for earnings manipulation through the selective taking of realized capital
gains or losses (usually involving the taking of realized capital gains
in order to improve poor results). The primary argument against including
unrealized capital gains and losses in earnings is the "realization
principle". Under this principle, it is argued that only realized income
and loss items should be included in the income statement [1].
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountanzs has not
taken a clear position on the treatment of unrealized capital gains and
losses in insurance company earnings. Most insurers take such a gain or
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loss as a direct credit or charge, respectively, to surplus rather than
a "flow-through" to earnings. The "flow-through" approach to earnings
measurement does not give an insurer an incentive to take realized capi-
tal gains in order to disguise bad performance. Thus, on an a priori
basis, one would expect earnings measures (B) and (D) to be more closely
associated with dividend decisions than measures (A) and (C), other
things remaining equal.
As a negative net income for an individual insurer in a particular
year is not unusual, a time aggregate earnings payout ratio is calculated
for each firm over the 21 year period. The resulting 61 payout ratios
for the 21 years are listed in Table 1.
During 1955-75, the ownership arrangement for these insurers can be
classified as (i) majority of common stock never held by a single entity
during the period, (ii) majority of common stock acquired by a single
entity sometime during the period, and (iii) majority of common stock
3held by a single entity throughout the period (see Appendix A). One
would expect that the earnings payout policies of insurers having widely
held common stock under ownership arrangement (i) would most closely
follow (or fit) the models found successful in describing dividend be-
havior in other industries. This is because the shareholders of these
insurers have the same objectives as other investors in widely held
equities. On the other hand, the dividend policies of wholly owned sub-
sidiaries under ownership arrangement (iii) would be determined by the
managerial discretions of the parent insurers or holding companies.
Dividends may be declared in these situations in order to reduce per-
ceived excess surpluses in the subsidiaries. Sometimes subsidiaries are
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acquired or holding companies are formed for the express purpose of trans-
ferring surplus from relatively unprofitable insurance operations to other
activities. The dividend policies of the insurers in group (ii) would be
expected to vary depending upon the individual circumstances surrounding
each acquisition.
The analysis of variance technique is used to test whether significant
differences arise among the earnings payout ratios for these three groups.
It is found that the average earnings payout ratios are significantly dif-
ferent among the three groups with a 5 percent level of significance if
the (A) or the (B) net income definition is used. Furthermore when either
the (A) or (B) income definition is used, the average earnings payout ratio
is higher than 50 percent. This figure is close to the earnings payout
ratio of the electric utility industry as indicated in Lee [11]. Empirical
studies related to this issue and the possible implications of a high earn-
ings payout ratio on the cost of equity capital will be done in separate
research.
As only a portion of the firms listed in Appendix A had actively
traded common stock during 1955-75, the dividend yield results are based
upon a subset of these insurers. The annual average shareholder dividend
yields calculated for these insurers are listed in Table 2. The analysis
of variance technique is used to test whether the dividend yield for the
non-life insurance companies changed over the 25 year period studied.
It is found from Table 2 that the shareholder dividend yields among
the years are significantly different at a one percent level of signifi-
cance. The average dividend yield for the 21 years studied is 3.38 per-
cent. This fluctuation is related to business cycles and economic
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conditions. The average dividend yields for 1974 and 1975 are 5.57 and
6.03 percent, respectively. These figures are as high as the time de-
posit interest rates in these respective years. This information sug-
gests that non-life insurance companies' stock dividend yields are
similar to those found for low risk investments.
The results of this section give both investors and decision makers
some cross-sectional and time series information about the earnings pay-
out ratios and dividend yields of non-life insurers.
II. DIVIDEND FORECASTING MODEL FOR THE
NON-LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Lintner [12] has used the partial adjustment assumption in order to
derive a dividend forecasting model for an industrial firm. This model
takes the following form:
AD, = y(D * - D„ .) (1)
where,
and,
t '
v
t t-1'
D
t
*
= 6 E
t
(2)
D = actual total cash dividend payment in period t
*
D = desired total cash dividend payment in period t
D .. = actual total dividend payment in period t-1
E = total earnings in period t
Y = partial adjustment coefficient
6 = target earnings payout ratio
-11-
After substituting (2) into (1) , we can formulate the following al-
ternative time series regression models in order to describe an individual
firm's dividend behavior over time:
D
t
= A
o
+
*l"t
+ Vt-1 + Elt (3)
D
t
= B
l
E
t
+ B
2
D
t-l
+ £
2t (4)
where A. = B- = 3y and A„ = B„ = 1-y; A is the intercept; and both
e.. and e„ are disturbance terms for the regressions. To accommodate
the two special circumstances we have encountered in this study (full and
partial dividend freezes and capital and surplus capacity considerations),
equation (3) is modified as
CS
D
t
= a
o
+ a
l
X
t
+ a
2
E
t
+ a
3
D
t-l
+ a
4 AlT + £ t (5)
where,
= for 1955-70
X
t
=1 for 1971-75
as dummy variables
and, CS
77— = capacity ratio
t
where,
CS = capital and surplus at the end of the period =
capital stock, plus paid in surplus, plus retained
earnings
AA = admitted assets at the end of the period
The change in a non-life insurer's capital and surplus is explained
by the following:
ACS =I+U-D+F+M
-12-
where,
I = net income or loss after taxes [the sum of the statutory
underwriting gain (loss) , net realized capital gain (loss)
,
interest, dividends, and rents, reduced by net loss from
agents' premium balances charged off, and adjusted for the
federal and foreign income tax liability (rebate)]
U = unrealized capital gain (loss)
D = dividends declared to shareholders and/or policyholders
F = external financing
M = miscellaneous adjustments (the sum of the change in the
excess of bodily injury liability and compensation statu-
tory and voluntary reserve over the case basis and loss
expense reserve, change in nonadmitted assets, change in
liability for unauthorized reinsurance, change in foreign
exchange adjustment, and net remittances to or from the
home office). Nonadmitted assets include furniture and
office equipment, unpaid balances over 90 days late, and
other items considered to be lacking in liquidity under
statutory accounting.
From the above model, it can be seen that an insurer needs to
retain capital and surplus in order to absorb (1) net losses from
operations (defined by I), (2) unrealized capital losses, and (3) mis-
cellaneous adjustments (defined by M) . Generally, items (1) and (2)
will cause the greatest surplus fluctuations in a given accounting
period. Net losses from operations may be compounded by the upward
adjustment of inadequate loss and loss adjustment expense reserves
arising from claims incurred in prior years. These adjustments can
be especially large during periods of rapid inflation.
The model indicates that the adjustment of dividends is one of
the most realistic alternatives in attempting to conserve capital and
surplus in the typical situation. This is because the raising of exter-
nal financing through new equity issues involves a transactions cost,
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uncertain proceeds (especially in volatile stock markets) , and is time
consuming as well as troublesome to management. Empirical data indicate
that new equity issues have not been an important form of external
financing in the non-life insurance industry [7]. External financing
involving mergers and acquisitions is not motivated by the need to con-
serve surplus as it does not affect the CS /AA ratio in most situations.
Contributions of surplus from parent insurers or holding companies, or
the borrowing of funds, have not been common external financing practices.
Thus, dividend policy is the only decision variable left.
It is also relevant to note the CS /AA ratios fluctuate widely
from period to period for a given insurer because of the impact of un-
realized capital gains and losses involving common stock portfolios and
fluctuating underwriting results (see Forbes [8]). Thus a non-life
insurer does not have time to consider external financing as a means of
stabilizing capital and surplus in the usual situation. The adjustment
of dividends is a more direct and immediate method of correcting capital
and surplus deficiencies. As an alternative hypothesis, it might be
argued that rapidly changing capital and surplus positions would make a
non-life insurer more cautious in its earnings payout policies. These
issues are explored by including the CS /AA ratio in equation (5).
In Table 2, we have calculated the average capacity ratios for 78 in-
surers for each of the years studied. Observation of the Table will in-
dicate that the average capacity ratio for the non-life insurance industry
fluctuates over time. This fluctuation may result from changes in the
value of insurance company equity portfolios and/or variations in under-
writing results. In addition, the coefficients of variation associated
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with the average capacity ratios in Table 3a suggest wide variations
in capacity ratios among the insurers for each year.
Table 3a presents a frequency distribution of the temporal coeffi-
cients of variation for the capacity ratios of the 78 insurers. It should
be noted that 73 percent of the coefficients in the Table fall within a
range of .1 to .3.
Table 3b shows the percentage distribution of the average 1955-75
capacity ratios for the 78 insurers. Approximately 64 percent of the
insurers had average capacity ratios within the range of .3 to .5.
The empirical results based upon this specification for 61 non-life
insurers during 1955-75 are reported in Table 4. From the t-values asso-
ciated with the regression coefficients of the dummy variable (a.. ) , it is
found that 15 out of 61 firms appeared to change their dividend payment
behavior because of the dividend freeze. Similarly, from the t-values
associated with the regression coefficients of the capacity variable (a,),
only 17 of the 61 firms had an a, coefficient significantly different
from zero. This implies that most of the insurers' dividend decisions were
not affected by a change in the capacity variable. This may be due to the
fact that a change in retained earnings is only one of two alternatives
for adjusting the capacity ratio. In general, a non-life insurance company
can also issue new equity in order to raise its capacity ratio. It should
also be noted that four alternative earnings definitions are used to fit
equation (5) . These empirical results in terms of income measure (A) are
reported in Table 4. The overall results are relatively independent of
the different income definitions used.
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One of the main purposes of equation (5) is to forecast a firm's
future dividend payment. The adjusted coefficient of determination
—2
(R ) provides an indication of a regression equation's statistical
—2
fit to historical data. Based upon Table 4, it is found that the R
—2
ranges from .0209 to .9845. The frequency distribution of R for these
61 firms indicated that more than 90 percent of these firms' dividend
—2
behaviors can be described by equation (5). Furthermore, the R are
classified according to the ownership arrangements (i)
,
(ii) , and (iii)
defined above. From the analysis of variance results indicated in Table
—2
5 it is found that significant differences exist for the R among these
three groups. The implication arising from these results is that the
ownership arrangement has an impact upon the dividend payment behavior
of a non-life insurer. This follows the expectations discussed earlier
—2
in the paper. Other possible explanations for the low R include the
presence of negative earnings in some of the years studied for a partic-
ular insurer and policyowner dividends. The percentages of policyowner
dividends to total dividends are listed in Table 6.
The estimated partial adjustment coefficient y and the percentage of
optimal dividend related to current earnings are of interest to both
investors and financial managers in the non-life insurance industry.
Based upon Table 4, the average y is .53 and average (B is .268. These
imply that the partial adjustment coefficient is .53 and the average
target payout ratio is 26.8 percent. The estimated y of .53 also im-
plies that it takes non-life insurance firms an average of about 2 years
to adjust their dividend payments to desirable levels.
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Fama and Babiak [6] have shown that Lintner's [12] model without the
constant term has the greatest forecasting power. Therefore, equation (5)
without a and a. is also calculated for the 61 firms. It is found that
o 4
—2
the R associated with Lintner's model without the constant term are gen-
erally lower than with the constant term. This is due to the fact that the
capacity ratio is important for 17 firms.
III. SUR AND AGGREGATE BEHAVIOR FOR SHAREHOLDER DIVIDENDS
In the final section of the paper, a pooled time series and cross
sectional simultaneous equation model will be constructed using the
following extensions of equation (3), above:
D
ti " *i
+W + cl (D (t-l)l>
D
t2 =
A
2
+ VEt2> + C2 (D (t-l)2 ) (6)
D_ = A + B (E„ ) + C (D. .. )
tn n n tn n (t-l)n
where the equations are generated for each year and the subscripts l...n
refer to each of the insurers studied.
Zellner's [15] seemingly unrelated regression method is now used
to simultaneously estimate these equation systems. The strength of this
method rests in its ability to consider the effects of both time and firm
behavior upon dividend policy.
We would anticipate that dividend behavior would vary by the
ownership arrangement of the insurer. Based upon the ownership arrange-
ment the OLS residuals associated with the shareholder dividend behavior
Total Insurers .73
Group i .92
Group ii .69
Group iii .62
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equation are used to estimate three variance-covariance matrices and
three correlation coefficient matrices. It is found that the relation-
ships among OLS residuals within each group are relatively strong. This
implies that Zellner's SUR method can be used to improve the efficiency
of the estimated shareholder dividend behavior relationship.
-2
The R values under the regressions without policyholder dividends
-2
are generally lower than the R values for the total dividends presented
in the third section of the paper. This is demonstrated by the following:
-2 -2
R for Total Dividends R for Shareholder Dividends
.64
.89
.50
.60
These results imply that the earnings payout decision is made on
the basis of total policyholder and shareholder dividends rather than
considering these dividends separately. It is also found that SUR pro-
vides a more accurate estimation of the regression coefficients than
the OLS method.
Overall, we found that the prior dividend was the most important
variable explaining the level of current shareholder dividends under the
SUR technique. This variable was significant at the 5 percent level for
100, 68 and 63 percent of the group i, ii, and iii insurers respectively.
Next, the capacity ratio was found to be important in explaining share-
holder dividends for 53, 44, and 44 percent of the group i, ii, and iii
insurers, respectively. Similar percentages for current earnings were
59, 32, and 50 percent respectively.
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The aggregated results for the equation (5) regression without the
dummy variable presented differ significantly from the disaggregated
results. This may be due to aggregation bias and/or the equal weighting
procedure in the individual company case. Also the correlation coeffi-
cient between the lagged dividend and the capacity ratio approximated a
negative .8.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have examined the shareholder and policyholder dividend policies
of a large sample of non-life insurers over 1955-75 in terms of some
widely accepted financial models. These models were applied using four
definitions of income and three insurer ownership groups. Adjustments
were also made for capacity ratios and the partial and complete dividend
freezes in the early 1970 's.
We found based upon a count of the significant t-values for the a„
coefficient in Table 4a for each earnings measure, that unrealized cap-
ital gains and losses were viewed as a transitory non-life insurance in-
come component in the earnings payout decision. This probably follows
from the widely accepted accounting practice of treating unrealized re-
sults as a surplus adjustment rather than an income component. In ad-
dition, we found that the total average earnings payout ratio was higher
than 50 percent for statutory income definitions. The average share-
holder dividend yield for all of insurers for 1955-75 was 3.38 percent.
However, this yield fluctuated widely over time. This was the result
of non-life insurance common stock prices tending to move in concert
with the overall market during this period.
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Lintner's dividend forecasting model was modified and applied to
the non-life insurance company sample. Regressions were run for both
total policyholder and shareholder dividends and the shareholder divi-
dends alone. On an overall basis, the ranking of the explanatory power
of the regressors was (1) the prior year's dividend, (2) the current
earnings, and (3) the capacity ratio. We also found a significant dif-
-2
ference in the R among the three ownership groups. It was also
determined that it takes approximately two years for non-life insurers
to adjust their total earnings payouts to desired target levels using
Lintner's formulation. The dummy variable for the partial and total
dividend freeze was also tested and found not to be important for the
great majority of insurers.
The cross-sectional and temporal average capacity ratios and
their coefficients of variation were calculated for the sample non-life
insurers. Over 50 percent of the insurers had average 1955-75 capacity
ratios ranging from .3 to .5. Wide variations in the temporal coeffi-
cients of variation in the capacity ratios of the individual insurers
were found. This resulted from different compositions of underwriting
and investment portfolios and varying premiums written/ capital and
surplus ratios among the insurers.
The SUR is superior to the OLS regression method if the OLS resi-
duals among the firms within the group are correlated. We found that
the SUR technique was superior to the OLS in estimating the dividend
determination behavior relationships for each of the three ownership
groups. This implies that there was some behavioral similarity in each
of these groups. The SUR findings were otherwise consistent with the
other findings in the paper.
-20-
The capacity ratio dominated the aggregate dividend determination
model. This result was at variance with the other results reported in
the paper. This may be due to aggregation bias.
The purpose of this research is to show how the finance theory and
technique used in the industrial firms can be used to do dividend deci-
sion of non-life insurance industry. The complication of dividend de-
cision for the non-life insurance industry relative to that of indus-
trial firms is the interaction relationships among different income
measure, ownership and capacity ratio and alternative definition of
dividend decision as is dictated in Figure 1. From the theoretical
analysis and empirical investigation of this paper it is found that
dividend decision rules used in the industrial firms can generally be
used to help the dividend decision for non-life financial managers.
However, the unique nature of the definitions and interaction relation-
ship of non-life insurance industries (see Figure 1). Some modifica-
tion of the dividend behavior decision model for industrial firms may
well be beneficial from the viewpoints of corporate finance theory
and practices.
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Footnotes
Other possible mechanisms for controlling the level of retained
earnings are: (1) decrease premiums written, and (2) reinsurance for
all or portion of the existing portfolio.
2
Foster [6] has investigated the impacts of these four alterna-
tive earnings on the market value of property-liability companies. One
of the referees has argued that the use of statutory earnings as a
dividend decision factor is unrealistic since management would recog-
nize the need to adjust earnings before such a decision was made.
However, alternative earning measures have different implications on
the earnings power of a non-life insurance firm. Therefore, different
income measures should lead to a difference in valuation approach for
non-life insurance companies as discussed by Foster [6].
3
It would be interesting to see the effect, if any, upon dividend
policy of a change in the common stock ownership of the firm. This will
be a subject for future research.
4
The "follow" or "fit" implies that the power of forecasting the div-
idends payment over time. The specific formulation and test of these
arguments are the adjusted coefficient of determination as defined in
the following section.
The measurement of the capacity ratio used in this paper does not
take into account the portfolio characteristics of the sample firm's
assets and liabilities. See Stone [15] for detail. The authors are
grateful to one of the referees for supplying these helpful comments.
M/E/66
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TABLE 1
AGGREGATE EARNINGS PAYOUT RATIOS
Insurer Group (i) Insurer Group (ii) Insurer Group (iii)
CO. El
b
E2
C
E3
d
E4
e
CO. El E2 E3 E4 CO. El E2 E3 E4
11 .83 .96 .72 .81 01 .89 .97 .85 .92 02 .55 .65 .51 .60
14 .67 .63 .64 .60 03 .53 .56 .47 .49 05 .14 .08 .11 .07
17 .82 .91 .79 .88 04 .74 .76 .68 .70 06 .83 .72 .78 .68
24 .75 1.61 .63 1.13 07 .62 .63 .57 .58 08 .83 1.14 .80 1.10
30 .21 .28 .16 .19 09 .58 .40 .51 .37 13 .67 .74 .64 .69
33 .71 .84 .58 .66 10 .53 .75 .53 .74 15 .66 .55 .49 .43
36 .99 1.22 .83 .99 12 .93 1.17 .78 .95 16 .36 .33 .35 .31
38 .73 .79 .57 .61 18 .96 1.05 .83 .89 19 .23 .35 .23 .33
40 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 23 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.14 20 .64 .55 .60 .51
44 .59 .85 .53 .72 25 .86 .80 .69 .65 21 .67 .88 .70 .93
45 .15 .15 .13 .13 31 .33 .35 .31 .33 22 .06 .06 .04 .04
46 .45 .28 .47 .29 34 .61 .66 .60 .65 26 .58 .62 .55 .58
48 .52 .42 .49 .40 37 .86 .82 .82 .79 27 .84 .66 .72 .59
56 .73 .65 .50 .46 39 .21 .20 .20 .19 28 -1.21 -.92 -2.14 -1.37
58 .37 .37 .31 .30 41 .32 .34 .27 .28 29 .55 .38 .47 .34
60 .77 .67 .68 .60 42 .97 1.26 .96 1.24 32 .11 .12 .10 .10
61 .49 .29 .44 .28 43 .37 .76 .80 .71 35 .77 .71 .71 .66
50 .50 .42 .45 .38 47 .33 .32 .27 .26
52 .80 .86 .80 .86 49 .35 .32 .30 .28
53 .92 .80 .85 .75 51 .33 .30 .30 .28
54 .65 .76 .62 .71
55 .55 .50 .45 .42
57 .30 .30 .27 .27
59 .24 .30 .22 .26
Average .61 .68 .53 .57 ,66 .69 .61 .64 .41 .43 .33 ,37
a = ownership groups (i), (ii), and (iii) are defined in the text.
b = total 1955-75 dividends •= total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition
c = total 1955-75 dividends * total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition
d = total 1955-75 dividends $ total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition
e = total 1955-75 dividends t total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition
(A) in text.
(B) in text.
(C) in text.
(D) in text.
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TABLE 2
NON-LIFE INSURER DIVIDEND YIELDS AND CAPACITY RATIOS
Annual Average Capacity Sample
Year Dividend Yield (%)
Mean
Ratio
C.V.
Size
1955 2.90% .4249 .4552 22
1956 3.37 .4040 .3988 23
1957 3.63 .3760 .4282 25
1958 3.38 .3960 .3874 26
1959 3.04 .4192 .6171 28
1960 3.58 .3903 .3941 28
1961 2.79 .4202 .3796 29
1962 2.70 .4010 .3850 28
1963 2.36 .4064 .3889 29
1964 2.48 .4093 .3997 30
1965 3.14 .4007 .3894 30
1966 3.14 .3742 .3979 28
1967 3.43 .3844 .3858 28
1968 3.30 .3872 .3597 26
1969 4.40 .3595 .4412 19
19 70 4.27 .3571 .4439 18
1971 2.90 .3766 .4033 19
19 72 2.72 .3960 .4006 21
1973 3.68 .3472 .4502 20
1974 5.57 .2794 .5845 21
1975 6.03 .2799 .5858 20
Overall
Average 3.38%
F-test results for average dividend yields among years 1955-75,
F = 5.3006 (significant at 1 percent level).
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Table 3a
Frequency Distribution of 1955 - 1975 Coefficient Variation
for Average Capacity Ratio
AT AND LESS
LEAST THAN
- 0.1
0.1 - 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
0.3 - 0.4
0.4 - 0.5
Number of Firms Percentage
8 10.25
25 32.05
32 41.03
9 11.54
3 3.85
1.4 - 1.5 1 1.28
78 100%
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Table 3b
Frequency Distribution of Average 1955 - 1975 Capacity Ratio
AT AND LESS
LEAST THAN
0.1 - 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
0.3 - 0.4
0.4 - 0.5
0.5 - 0.6
0.6 - 0.7
0.7 - 0.8
0.8 - 0.9
Number of Firms Percentage
2 2.56%
15 19.23%
36 46.15%
14 17.95%
4 5.13%
4 5.13%
2 2.57%
1 1.28%
78 100%
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TABLE 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (7)-
INCCME MEASUREMENT (A)
Co . No.
a
a a, a„ a o a / R
2
S.E.
b
1 2 3 4
(01) 28856 48347 1.0732 -.1909 -1477.9 .8705 22487
(1.03) c (2.73) (7.99) (-1.64) (-2.32)
(02) -2 088.7 5311.6 .0615 1.0043 -88.1867 .9572 2179.9
(-.41) (1.48) (.84) (9.13) (-.63)
(03) -33600 -22349 .444 .4477 1615.8 .4771 18474
(-.87) (-1.79) (2.02) (1.55) (1.41)
(04) 41880 10161 .377 -.3301 -913.30 .8093 4100.4
(3.51) (1.99) (3.68) (-1.12) (-3.18)
(05) 111.92 21.052 -.0146 .5626 1.9058 .6159 103.67
(.36) (.26) (-.97) (3.37) (.19)
(06) 2224.4 89.114 -.012 .6742 -42.8317 .7374 499.14
(2.07) (.17) (-.11) (2.83) (-1.28)
(07) 4606.9 -2050.4 .1777 -.1215 -26.82 .9107 474.73
(4.69) (-5.05) (4.04) (-.83) (-1.51)
(08) -7201.8 957.27 -1.2438 .2049 224.87 .4194 2474.7
(-2.23) (.57) (-2.26) (.97) (2.56)
(09) 3209.8 1464.7 .1395 .9153 -144.21 .7183 1406.4
(.48) (.66) (1.32) (2.29) (-.79)
(10) -271.55 116.32 .0601 .2545 14.329 .5125 135.36
(-.79) (1.58) (1.57) (1.48) (1.33)
(11) 3651.3 -149.76 .1194 .7052 -103.72 .9865 632.16
(1.31) (-.22) (13.95) (5.71) (-1.39)
(12) 483.36 -342.8 -.0194 .4561 6.182 .5171 232.98
(.73) (-2.53) (-.47) (1.61) (.31)
(13) 371.99 -360.08 .1098 .7322 2.5613 .8936 294.38
(.48) (-1.23) (1.97) (3.98) (.13)
(14) -1146 -464.32 -.0279 .706 93.125 .9771 190.12
(-1.28) (-2.1) (-.4) (8.87) (2.66)
(15) 2595.05 -1705.75 -.1866 -.2681 -1.2436 .3308 1137.2
(1.29) (-2.61) (-1.09) (-.62) (-.02)
(16) 266.56 -11.34 .0031 .3117 .1542 .5612 29.8
(3.76) (-.56) (.42) (4.10) (.10)
(17) -6628 3664.6 .0089 1.1095 54.7184 .9825 1572.4
(-3.22) (2.28) (.35) (16.55) (1.89)
(18) 25089 7552.2 .4611 .1089 -633.14 .4185 9842.5
(2.22) (.92) (2.27) (.5) (-1.88)
(19) -234.61 511.6 .0602 .3044 -.0705 .1690 737.46
(-.09) (.97) (.27) (1.25) (-.00)
(20) 632.62 278.37 .0731 .5974 -21.454 .8193 204.76
(2) (2.31) (2.1) (4.42) (-2.75)
(21) -474.03 -83.623 -.0611 -.2239 21.8 .3824 336.77
(-1.28) (-.44) (-.45) (-.85) (2.64)
(22) -158.59 820.79 .0563 -.1037 -13.14 .75 294.31
(-.18) (1.68) (3.29) (-.52) (-.59)
-28-
TABLE 4 (con't.)
Co. No. a a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R
2
S.E.
(23) 236.36 -132.37 .2276 .6218 -.5987 .7821 174.42
(.94) (-1.04) (3.19) (4.45) (-.04)
(24) 76.332 -30.198 .0146 .7806 14.1488 .7048 386.83
(.12) (-.12) (.64) (4.84) (.75)
(25) 133.92 12.326 .0223 .3131 -1.3485 .75 12.874
(5.27) (1.09) (2.98) (3.00) (-2.73)
(26) 1011.7 12.994 .0561 .1079 -21.728 .3014 101.96
(2.98) (.21) (.76) (.57) (-2.05)
(27) 5649.4 946.63 .4176 .0973 -148.02 .7476 1004.5
(2.9) (.90) (2.68) (.33) (-2.7)
(28) 8211.5 -3162.3 .2192 1.1228 -119.34 .8404 2004.8
(4.58) (-2.72) (3.29) (5.77) (-3.03)
(29) -1563.5 -290.22 .2386 -.2357 54.328 .3096 219.41
(-2.36) (-1.41) (.78) (-1.11) (2.41)
(30) 22.086 -5.1426 .0515 .8264 -.0806 .9866 42.299
(.37) (-.10) (1.54) (5.42) (-.03)
(31) -12.87 -32.086 .13279 .3581 3.5981 .6896 141.45
(-.04) (-.19) (1.86) (1.83) (.42)
(32) 178.68 -113.31 .0212 .7986 -1.1135 .9422 92.144
(1.01) (-.89) (.93) (5.38) (-.73)
(33) 129.26 -16.705 .0661 .5398 -1.6399 .9359 18.196
(1.66) (-.98) (3.73) (2.66) (-1.11)
(34) 135.03 -193.11 .1684 .5969 6.5116 .9463 189.98
(.45) (-.92) (1.16) (1.78) (.56)
(35) 2240.8 3069.2 .8689 .2253 -161.74 .3504 6055.8
(.15) (.48) (1.30) (.80) (-.6)
(36) 59.841 5.7237 .0182 .7153 -.3979 .8378 14.71
(1.26) (.48) (1.44) (3.44) (-1.04)
(37) -20111 8985.1 1.1034 .4233 182.74 .6978 7045.5
(-1.3) (1.59) (4.08) (2.32) (.57)
(38) -7459.8 1379.9 -.0318 1.6049 195.75 .881 715.82
(-1.93) (1.69) (-.67) (4.49) (1.75)
(39) 799.85 -739.81 .0031 .0157 19.998 .9635 194.45
(6.78) (-6.59) (.81) (.32) (19.84)
(40) 7.3184 -42.759 .8356 1.7461 .7457 44.817
(.12) (-1.72) (-.61) (5.36) (.92)
(41) 1016.4 -908.3 .3012 -.5897 -2.7769 .8896 268.97
(1.48) (-1.62) (3.08) (-1.18) (-.43)
(42) 317045 122943 .3593 -.4354 -5716 .4084 109098
(2.16) (1.10) (.68) (-1.61) (-2.00)
(43) -989.77 351.41 2.1274 .174 -91.979 .8914 2095.4
(-.18) (.21) (9.03) (1.35) (-1.1)
(44) 4.7857 2.1733 .0333 .8963 -.0282 .9353 4.3958
(.48) (.33) (1.69) (10.1) (-.15)
(45) 823.23 -125.00 .0017 .7098 -8.739 .9362 76.1949
(2.02) (-1.57) (.54) (4.98) (-1.25)
(46) 27.2701 6.0099 .07781 .8345 -.3367 .9463 11.9968
(.32) (.65) (2.33) (8.11) (-.3)
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TABLE 4 (con't.)
Co. No. a a
l
a
2
a
4
a
4
I2 S.E.
(47) 637.75 -397.18 .0201 -.4872 -5.936 .3842 205.65
(2.4) (-2.09) (.21) (-1.20) (-1.00)
(48) -171.78 198.29 .0038 1.1509 -1.8817 .984 126.47
(-.54) (1.37) (.22) (15.86) (-.27)
(49) 4.7876 3.1862 .0242 .9569 .0307 .9821 17.961
(.12) (.16) (3.99) (12.35) (.04)
(50) -53.344 -3 7.445 .0229 .6896 4.4049 .542 150.27
(-.22) (-.26) (.66) (2.21) (.68)
(51) -32.542 5.29 .0198 1.0743 .6195 .9766 25.401
(-.57) (.15) (2.02) (10.62) (.72)
(52) 3676 -1260.8 .5737 .089 -71.872 .82 66 1026.1
(2.67) (-1.47) (3.41) (.48) (-1.34)
(53) 50783 -14548 -.4155 -.3623 -543.13 .5344 9389.4
(4.34) (-1.88) (-1.51) (-1.77) (-2.66)
(54) -744.65 -757.48 -.0171 -.0399 56.1391 .0209 2652.4
(-.2) (-.31) (-.07) (-.16) (.53)
(55) 855.25 -146.2 .1232 .6583 -13.2631 .9582 265.47
(1.3) (-.45) (5.00) (4.74) (-1.24)
(56) 300.33 -40.63 .0843 1.0597 -7.668 .9382 67.948
(1.72) (-.47) (1.62) (5.97) (-2.09)
(57) -126.11 -153.88 -.0592 .7387 17.3201 .5249 192.4
(-.26) (-.92) (-1.83) (3.34) (1.44)
(58) 6.1672 -37.944 .0402 .8567 1.3717 .8506 40.326
(.07) (-.8) (.81) (4.55) (.67)
(59) 93.2801 8.5132 .024 .8533 -1.0067 .912 61.563
(.73) (.15) (.66) (4.69) (-.54)
(60) -9381.5 9615.2 .093 1.1848 -42.876 .988 2029.8
(-2.74) (3.77) (1.87) (17.65) (-.45)
(61) -356.07 -202.36 -.0227 1.1427 16.443 .9845 119.6
(-.75) (-1.37) (-1.13) (17.95) (1.37)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
"All values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 5
-2
F-TEST FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN R
AMONG OWNERSHIP GROUPS
Ownership Group
(i)
a
(ii)
(iii)
Overall
Average
—2
Average R
.917705
.690487
.623534
.731858
F Value
9.0361
See text for the definition.
Significant at .038% level.
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TABLE 6
AVERAGE 1955-75 RATIOS OF POLICYOWNER DIVIDENDS TO TOTAL DIVIDENDS
INA
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY
FEDERAL
AMERICAN STATES
ROYAL INDEMNITY
WESTCHESTER FIRE
PBOVIDENCE WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
PEERLESS
EMPLOYERS FIRE
EMPLOYERS CASUALTY
UNITED PACIFIC
AMERICAN GENERAL
RELIANCE
AFFILIATED FM
CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
CALIFORNIA COMPENSATION AND FIRE
HANOVER
AMERICAN POLICYHOLDERS
GLOBE INDEMNITY
PACIFIC
TRI STATE
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
WEST AMERICAN
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE
AMERICAN DRUGGISTS
THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORPORATION
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY
THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY
TRINITY UNIVERSAL
UNITED FIRE AND CASUALTY
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
WESTERN CASUALTY AND SURETY
Mean
.0170
.0979
.3133
.0409
.0033
.1010
.0824
.1106
.2366
.1461
.1544
,7680
.1237
.0379
.0259
1.000
.1981
1.000
.9440
.0418
.7301
.0912
.0879
.2190
.1139
1.000
.7339
.0694
.3692
.2413
.0096
.0183
.6176
.6764
.1001
.0041
.0025
.0301
.1718
.0356
.0712
.0237
.0986
.4016
.0288
.0102
.1070
.0991
.2899
.0808
.2194
,2227
.0341
.2962
.0255
.0445
.3853
.0360
.0627
.0799
.0956
.2163
.3574
.1858
.4040
.0813
.4306
.1379
.0207
.0334
.4633
.1208
.1313
.0107
.0086
.4426
.2490
.0428
.0878
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FIGURE 1
OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS, EARNINGS MEASURES, AND
DIVIDEND DEFINITIONS AVAILABLE FOR ANALYSIS
Ownership
Group
Earnings
Definition" Dividend Definition
ii
iii
(1) = with policyowner
dividends
(2) = without policyowner
dividends
bee text for definitions.
Figure 1 summarizes the combinations of potential ownership arrange-
ments, earnings definitions, and dividend definitions that could be
tested in this study.
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APPENDIX A
Co. No. Company List Co. No. Company List
01 INA (ii) 49
02 Hartford Accident & Indemnity (iii) 50
03 AETNA Casualty & Surety (ii) 51
04 Federal (ii) 52
05 American States (iii) 53
06 Royal Indemnity (iii) 54
07 Westchester Fire (ii) 55
08 Calvert Fire (ii) 56
09 Ohio Casualty (ii) 57
10 Providence Washington (ii) 58
11 Government Employees (i) 59
12 Peerless (ii) 60
•13 Employers Fire (iii) 61
14 Employers Casualty (i)
15 United Pacific (iii)
16 National Casualty (iii)
17 American General (i)
18 Reliance (ii)
19 American Credit Indemnity (iii)
20 Affiliated FM (iii)
21 Connecticut Indemnity (iii)
22 State Farm Fire & Casualty (iii)
23 California Compensation & Fire (ii)
24 Hanover (i)
25 Utah Home Fire (ii)
26 American Policyholders (iii)
27 Globe Indemnity Co. (iii)
28 Pacific (Earlier Guarantee) (iii)
29 Tri State (iii)
30 American Bankers (i)
31 Civil Service Employees (ii)
32 West American (iii)
33 Excelsior Insurance Company of New York (i)
34 Republic Indemnity (ii)
35 American Automobile (iii)
36 American Druggists Insurance Co. (i)
37 The American Insurance Co. (ii)
38 American Reinsurance (i)
39 Bituminous Casualty Corp. (ii)
40 Carolina Casualty (i)
41 The Cincinnati Insurance Co. (ii)
42 The Continental Insurance Co. (ii)
43 Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland (ii)
44 Firemens Insurance Company of Washington D.C. (i)
45 General Reinsurance Corp. (i)
46 Germantown Insurance Co. (i)
47 Harbor Insurance Co. (iii)
48 The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. (iii)
Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. (ii)
Northeastern Insurance Co. of Hartford (iii)
Pacific Employers (ii)
Phoenix Insurance Co. (ii)
Reinsurance Corporation of New York (ii)
Republic Insurance Co. (ii)
South Carolina Insurance Co. (i)
Trinity Universal Insurance Co. (ii)
United Fire & Casualty Co. (i)
United Fire Insurance Co. (ii)
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (i)
Western Casualty and Surety Co. (i)
(i)
Ownership arrangements are in the parentheses following the company names,
(i), (ii), and (iii) ownership arrangements are defined in the text.
These
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